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FAIRNESS AND FERES: A CRITIQUE OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF INJUSTICE
JoAN M. BERNOTT*
A survey of writing on this topic leads rapidly to the conclusion that,

unbeknownst to the United States Supreme Court, there is something
seriously wrong with the Feres doctrine.' Lower federal courts and com-2
mentators join in "widespread, almost universal criticism" of the doctrine.
Judges apply Feres "reluctantly," 3 "serious[ly] doubt[ing]" its theoretical
bases, 4 "regret[ting] [its] effects," 5 and suspecting or believing that the
doctrine "should be reconsidered. ' 6 But the High Court continues to
embrace and proclaim it, without apology or dissent. 7 Who is right?

Much current commentary promotes the so-called post-discharge duty
theory as a welcome "inroad" on the doctrine,8 and decries Feres' "extension" to genetic injury claims predicated on in-service injuries to servicemen. 9
These often heated discussions, however, almost invariably leave unexamined
their premise: that the Feres doctrine intrinsically is unfair. Furthermore,
the commentators assume the truth of the personal injury claims in issue,
as is necessary given the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 10 The image
* Special Litigation Counsel to the Torts Branch of the United States Department of
Justice. Previous lead trial counsel for the United States in the Agent Orange Multidistrict
Litigation. B.A., Oakland University, 1969; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1973.
The author is greatly indebted to Robert C. Longstreth, Esq. and Frederick Conway, Esq. for
their suggestions and advice regarding this article.
1. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) ("concludels] that the Government
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act [28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); §§ 2671-80] for injuries
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service").
2. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
3. Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1082 (1983).
4. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5. Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1082 (1983).
6. Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1973).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3044 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Szykowny, Duty to Warn as an Inroad to the Feres Doctrine: A Theory
of Tort Recovery for the Veteran, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 267, 271 (1982).
9. E.g., Comment, Pushing the Feres Doctrine a Generation too far: Recovery for
Genetic Damage to the Children of Service Members, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1039, 1052 (1983);
Note, If You Can't Save Us, Save Our Families: The Feres Doctrine and Servicemen's Kin,
U. ILL. L. REv. 317, 321 (1983).
10. Because Feres protects against "the suit, not [merely] the recovery," the Feres defense
almost invariably is considered in the context of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b). See Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815-816 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 819 (1973); accord Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom Sheehan v. United States, 466 U.S. 995 (1984); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b).
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they thus generate-of armies of remediless cancer-ridden veterans and
birth-defective children-is a daunting obstacle to dispassionate doctrinal
analysis.
An unexamined ethical premise coupled with the presumed existence of
large numbers of persons in desperate need of judicial relief is a potent
jurisprudential mix. It provides a better explanation than logic for postdischarge, genetic injury, and other recent decisions that openly "denigrate"
the Feres doctrine and attempt to amend it." Considering the national
security and constitutional ramifications of Feres, examination of its supposed unfairness is overdue and useful. This article's purpose is to begin
that examination.
THE Feres DocTmn- As DECLARED By THE SuPREmE CotrT

In 1946, after decades of debate, Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1346(b) et seq., which, with certain exceptions, waived sovereign immunity for the "ordinary, common law torts"
of federal employees.' 2 Three years later, the Supreme Court held that
servicemen qua servicemen were entitled to FTCA relief, at least so long as
the injuries for which they sued were not sustained "incident to service."' 3
Almost immediately, the Court was confronted with the "wholly different
case" of servicemen's suits for injuries sustained incident to military service.14
Feres v. United States was a consolidation of three cases from three
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals: Mrs. Feres' decedent perished in
an alleged negligently-caused barracks fire while on active duty, and the
other two cases alleged medical malpractice committed against active duty
servicemen.' 5 Of the twelve federal judges that considered the cases in the
lower courts, nine had held that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action.' 6
All nine Supreme Court justices agreed with them.
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court stressed by way of
introduction that, since "few guiding materials" illuminated their task of
statutory interpretation, "no conclusion can be above challenge, but.., at

11. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
see infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (discussing district court's decision in Agent

Orange).
12. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1952).
13. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).

14. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
15. See Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135
(1950); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 708-11 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d

518 (4th Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949).

16. A split Tenth Circuit panel reversed dismissal of the medical malpractice wrongful
death complaint in Griggs v. United States. See Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir.
1949). The dissenting judge in Griggs adopted the reasoning of the District Court in Jefferson
v. United States. See id. (Huxman, J., dissenting); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
706, 711-16 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
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least Congress possess[ed] a ready remedy" for any misinterpretation of the
FTCA.17 The Court then produced what lower courts since have rarely
recognized for what it was: a statutory interpretation inspired by equity.
"This Act," stated the Court, "should be construed to fit ... into the
entire statutory system of remedies against the Government to make a
workable, consistent and equitable whole."." The Court evidently was not
concerned about any deficit of relief for servicemen implicit in the result
in Feres. However, it was compelled to note the surfeit of relief for
servicemen implicit in Brooks v. United States, which permitted a tort suit
for injuries already compensated under military law.19 The FTCA was
intended to "extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it
incidentally benefited those already well provided for [by a comprehensive
system of relief]," wrote Justice Jackson for the Feres Court, "it appears
' 20
to have been unintentional.
The gravamen of Feres is that the FTCA created no "new causes of
action;" that the liability proposed by petitioner Feres was new; and that,
therefore, such liability a fortiori was not created by the FTCA. 21 The Court
also noted that basing federal liability to servicemen on "the law of the
[state] where the act or omission occurred" made "no sense" in any incidentto-service case. 22 "It would hardly be a rational plan," said the Court, "of
providing for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them
dependent upon geographic considerations over which they have no control
and to laws which fluctuate in existence and value." 23
Finally, the Court observed that the statutory scheme of compensation
' 24
for injuries or death to servicemen was "simple, certain, and uniform;
was neither "negligible [n]or niggardly; and "normally require[d] no liti-

17. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id.; see Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52.
20. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140; see id. at 144 (discussing double recovery under both FTCA
and servicemen's compensation statutes).
21. See id. at 141. The point could not have been more emphatic:
[P]laintiffs can point to no liability of a 'private individual' even remotely analogous
to that which they are asserting against the United States. We know of no American
law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his
superior officers or the Government he is serving. Nor is there any [private individual]
liability 'under like circumstances'....
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting FrCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see also id. at 142 ("[Even]
if we indulge plaintiffs the benefit of [a] comparison [with states and their militia], claimants
cite us no state, and we know of none, which has permitted members of its militia to maintain
tort actions for injuries suffered in the service ....

");

id. ("We find no parallel liability

before, and we think no new one has been created by, this act. Its effect ... was not to visit
the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities."); id. at 146 ("We cannot impute
to Congress such a radical departure from established law in the absence of express congressional command").
22. Id. at 142 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982)).
23. Id.at 143.
24. Id. at 144.
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gation," at which soldiers are at a "peculiar disadvantage" anyway."5 The

"vital distinction" between Brooks and Beres was that "the injury to Brooks
did not arise out of or in the course of military duty.''26 The Feres Court
unanimously concluded that "the Government is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of

or are in the course of activity incident to service. "27
In the ensuing thirty-six years, the Supreme Court refined the "incident
to service" test by permitting a veteran to sue for a post-discharge injury
caused by post-discharge federal negligence in United States v. Brown,2
and firmly refusing to endorse an on-base, on-duty litmus test in United

States v. Shearer.29 The Court also confirmed that the Feres doctrine could

not be avoided through third-party process, 30 or through suits against military
31

officers in their individual capacities.

CRITICAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
LOWER COURTS

Feres DOCTRINE

BY

There was little in Feres v. United States that foretold the corrosive
critical interpretations that now exist. While not strict statutory construction
in the "plain meaning" sense, the Feres analysis was well-rooted in precedent
and syllogisticly reasoned. The analysis per se (i.e., the Supreme Court's
reading of the statute and Congress's intent) provoked no substantial
scholarly challenge at the time. Nor, unsurprisingly, is it commonly criticized
even now; Feres' ever more prolonged congressional ratification has tended
25. Id. at 145.
26. Id.at 146.
27. Id.
28. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). The Court in United States v.Brown stressed that the nerve injury
for which Brooks sued "was not incurred while [he] was on active duty or subject to military
discipline. The injury occurred after his discharge, while he enjoyed a civilian status." Id.at
112. "Since the negligent act giving rise to the injury ... was not incident to the military
service, the Brooks case governs and the judgment must be affirmed." Id. at 113. Troubled
by the "unjustifiable discrimination" favoring veterans over active-duty servicemen, three
justices dissented. See id. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting) (joined by Reed, J. and Minton, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters reasoned that "but for" his military entitlement to treatment in a
veterans' hospital, "this veteran could not have been injured ...." Id. at 114 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
29. 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1985). In United States v. Shearer, all eight participating justices
disavowed reduction of the Feres doctrine to a "few bright-line rules" such as on-base situs
of injury. Id. at 3043. The Court reversed the Third Circuit's remand of a wrongful death
action premised on one serviceman's murder by another serviceman while both were off-duty
and off the military base, noting that the claims struck at the "core" of Feres concerns: i.e.,
they "went directly to the 'management' of the military; ...question[ing] basic choices about
discipline, supervision and control of a serviceman." Id. (footnote omitted).
30. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977). In
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, the Court affirmed dismissal of a third-party
FTCA claim brought by an aircraft manufacturer sued by a military pilot injured when his
ejection mechanism malfunctioned. Id. at 667-68, 674; see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Stencel Aero).
31. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-304 (1983).
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to moot criticism that the Supreme Court's interpretive analysis was inher-

ently wrong.3 2 To a lesser degree, so has the broad international endorsement

of Feres-type rules by countries all over the world.33

Nevertheless, current commentators and courts express almost unanimous dismay at Feres' unfairness. 34 They subject its 'grounds' to an avalanche of critical re-examination, 35 implying that the judicial branch has
discretion simply to reverse the statutory interpretation contained in Feres,
notwithstanding thirty-seven years of congressional ratification. And some
courts have re-read Feres, Brown and Shearer to mean that in certain kinds
of cases, the FTCA does compensate in-service injuries. But the analyses
on which these cases purport to rely are weak. Some have provoked criticism

32. Since Feres was decided, Congress repeatedly has ratified it. Of recent note, for
example, several congresses have considered, but failed to enact, legislation that would allow
service members to bring medical malpractice suits. See H.R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. Rac. H541 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1985); H.R. 1942, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG.
Rac. H887 (daily ed. March 4, 1983). Congress also has acted to extend Feres' application.
See H.R. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN.
NEWS 2692, 2695 (when Congress amended the FTCA in 1981 to include certain National
Guardsmen, the House Judiciary Committee stated that its intent was that "the rule of the
Feres case should apply to the acts or omissions of National Guard personnel"). Cf. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2212 (Supp. 1985) (statute substituting the United States for defendant-atomic test contractors
specifies that Feres would apply to such suits). One commentator, however, has briefly argued
that in Feres the Supreme Court ignored congressional intent. See Cyze, The Federal Tort
Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Servicemen, 14 VAL. U. L. REv. 527, 549-553 (1980).
33. A national tradition disallowing a serviceman tort recovery for "negligence, against
either his superior officers or the government," generally is followed in democracies. Feres,
340 U.S. at 135. Suits by servicemen against their governments are barred in Canada, France,
West Germany and curtailed severely in England. See, e.g., Crown Liability Act, § 4 R.S.C.,
Ch. C-38 (1970) (Canada); Law of France of Aug. 4, 1962 (supplemented by the law of Nov.
18, 1972) (France); Law on Rights of Civil Servants, BGBI.I (1977) (West Germany); HALSBURY'S STATtrrEs or ENGLAND, 3d Ed., Vol. 8: Section 10, Crown Proceedings Act of 1947
(England); accord Parker v. Common-Wealth, 38 AusTRAiAN L.J. 444, 446 (1964-65) (Australia); T. IsoN, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COM11ENTARY ON THE NEw ZEALAND ScHEsmE 13,
16 (1980) (New Zealand); State Redress Act, reprinted in LAvs OF TIM RrtnLIc OF KOREA
(3d Ed. 1975) at 293 (Korea).
34. See Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1082 (1983); Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Peluso v. United
States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Szykowny, supra
note 8; Comment, supra note 9; Note, supra note 9; Hislop-Brumfield, infra note 80.
35. See, e.g., Cyze, supra, note 32; Comment, The Prenatal Plaintiff and the Feres
Doctrine: Throwing Baby out with the Bath Water? 20 WILLAT'rrE
L.R. 495, 533 (1984)
("[Tihe Supreme Court has never articulated a workable rationale for the Feres doctrine ....
);
Smith, The Feres Doctrine: Should it Continue to Bar FTCA Actions by Servicemen Who Are
Injured While Involved in Activities Incident to their Service? 49 J. Am L. & CoM. 177, 210
(1983) ("Many courts and commentators have attacked the underlying factors supporting Feres,
and only the concern for military discipline retains any substantial validity"). Feres' 'grounds'
are generally considered to include the anomaly of state law governing federal liability to
servicemen; the availability of alternative compensation; the special relationship between
servicemen and the government they serve; and the necessity for preserving military discipline.
See supra, notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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as intense, if not widespread, as that showered on the Feres doctrine itself.
1.

Post-discharge negligence and the Broudy cause of action.

Surely the most tortuously developed and controversial "exception" to
the Feres doctrine is the theory that a serviceman may bring an FTCA suit
to redress an injury he sustained incident to his active service if he alleges
some federal breach of an independent or separate post-discharge tort of
omission.3 6 Purportedly premised on Brown, the theory's true antecedents

are Thornwell v. United States,37 and Everett v. United
States,3" which are
39
among the most criticized federal cases of their time.
The Broudy theory contradicts the plain language of Feres. Serviceman
Broudy's post-discharge cancer, allegedly the latent result of in-service
radiation exposure during atomic tests twenty years previously, plainly

"ar[o]se out of or [was] in the course of activity incident to [his] service."

4

While the Broudy court stressed the need for independence or separateness
of the "post-service negligent act," '4' that "separate [post-discharge] injury"

was a fiction. 42 Indeed, it is doubtful that any post-discharge federal tort
of complete omission can cause a truly separate post-discharge injury for
purposes of Feres.43 The Ninth Circuit implicitly conceded as much in a

36. See Broudy v. United States (Broudy 1), 661 F.2d 125, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1981); Broudy
v. United States (Broudy I1), 722 F.2d 566, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1983).
37. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
38. 492 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
39. Thornwell held that the government's post-discharge negligent failure to inform
plaintiff that he had been exposed to LSD while in the service was "distinctly separate" from
the in-service willful exposure, thus was actionable despite Feres. 471 F. Supp. at 351. The
Thornwell analysis has been squarely rejected as "inconsistent with Feres" in Laswell v. Brown.
See Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 267 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom Laswell v.
Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). Moreover, the analysis has been questioned even in its own
circuit. See Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 220 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1118 (1983). With the exception of Everett, every court that considered Thornwell
or a Thornwell-style claim in the context of a toxic substance case rejected it. See Stanley v.
CIA (Stanley 1), 639 F.2d 1146, 1153-56 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Fountain v. United States, 533
F. Supp. 698, 701-702 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 359-60 (E.D. Pa.
1981); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 437 (E.D. Va. 1980); cf. infra note 52
(discussing Stanley I and Eleventh Circuit's decision in Stanley I1).
In Everett the district court held that a serviceman could state a claim for damages caused
by the government's post-discharge negligent failure to warn of radiation dangers where that
failure was a "distinctly separate pattern of conduct" from the government's alleged intentional
tort of exposing the serviceman to radiation for experimental purposes. 492 F. Supp. at 326.
Everett specifically has been rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Lombard, supra, at 230; the
Eighth Circuit in Laswell, supra, at 266-67; the Fifth Circuit in Stanley, supra, at 1153; and
the Third Circuit in Heilman v. United States. See Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104,
1107 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984). Plaintiff in Everett ultimately voluntarily dismissed her complaint.
40. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
41. Broudy I, 661 F.2d at 128-29; Broudy I, 722 F.2d at 570.
42. See Broudy I, 661 F.2d at 128-29; Broudy II, 722 F.2d at 568-70.
43. Cf. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111-13 (1954); supra note 28 (discussing
Supreme Court's decision in Brown).
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later case by reducing Broudy I's "independent, post-discharge act" to a
mere legal "theory of recovery" in a later case. 4
Apart from this difficulty of contradicting Feres, the Broudy analysis
suffers other weaknesses. On later hearing of the case, the Ninth Circuit
further fictionalized the supposed independent post-discharge tort for purposes of the FTCA's jurisdictional administrative claim requirement: it
excused Mrs. Broudy's failure to file a claim on the post-discharge tort. 45
The same panel also skated over the evident absence of another FTCA
46
jurisdictional requisite-analogous private person liability under state law.
Other circuits have produced a landslide of authority contrary to Broudy,
recognizing the supposed post-discharge tort as a Feres-barred "continuing
tort." 47 Also, tension exists even within the Ninth Circuit, where postdischarge case law has taken on the contours of a contest between an
appellate bench insisting that servicemen's radiation claims be tried, and a
48
trial bench insisting that, given Feres, there is nothing that can be tried.

44. Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
45. After the district court dismissed Broudy I on remand because the plaintiff had not filed
an administrative claim on the post-discharge tort, the Broudy II court reversed. See Broudy II, 722
F.2d at 568-69. The Ninth Circuit similarly reversed the district court in Shipek v. United
States, which understandably had reasoned that, if the post-discharge act truly was independent
of the in-service tort, an administrative claim for only the former was an inadequate jurisdictional predicate for the latter. See Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.
1985). "IT]he district court erred," said the Ninth Circuit panel, "in stating that appellant
'cannot have it both ways,' i.e., that she could not allege a post-discharge tort sufficiently
separate from her husband's military service to evade Feres yet sufficiently related to his
service to have been included in her administrative claim. Broudy II is to the contrary." Id.
46. In Broudy II, the Ninth Circuit "note[d] for the purpose of providing guidance [on
remand] that California law imposes a duty upon those who create a foreseeable peril, not
readily discoverable by the endangered person, to warn them of such potential peril." Broudy
II, 722 F.2d at 569 n.l. But the case that the court cited, Johnson v. California, imposed no
duty to warn of unforseeable consequences, and the unforeseeability (at the time of in-service
exposure) of the post-discharge injury was absolutely crucial to its theoretical separateness or
independence from military service. See Johnson v. Calif., 69 Cal.2d 782, 785-786, 447 P.2d
352, 355 (1968). As the district court in Broudy II had observed, no court in any state had
imposed on an employer a free-floating duty to warn former employees of hazards associated
with employment conditions previously considered harmless. Broudy II, 722 F.2d at 569.
47. See Hamilton v. United States, 719 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Gaspard v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom Sheehan v. United States,
466 U.S. 975 (1984); Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 220 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 266 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub nom Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146,
1154 (5th Cir. 1981); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698, 701-02 (W.D. Ark. 1981);
Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 359-61 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Vietnam veterans' claims dismissed
because they "neither allege nor support a conclusion that the post-discharge failure to warn
was sufficiently separate and distinct from the underlying 'incident to service' tort claims");
Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 437 (E.D. Va. 1980); Wisniewski v. United
States, 416 F. Supp. 599, 601 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
48. CompareBroudy I, 661 F.2d at 128-29 (which reversed and remanded case "to be heard
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Nevertheless, the Broudy theory recently won a new and strong adherent
when the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded dismissal of a claim of
49
post-discharge failure to warn of radiation hazards in Cole v. United States.
The Cole court belittled its own concern that the trial "may adversely affect
future practices of the armed forces, particularly where, as here, the need
for the [challenged] decision arises out of the government's treatment of an
active-duty serviceman." 50 As has happened repeatedly in the Ninth Circuit,
the Cole district court dismissed the remanded case on a pretrial motion.,
The Broudy cause of action, however, will doubtless be heard from again.
The Eleventh Circuit already has displayed sufficient determination to
sustain the theory that it will create opportunities to do so even without
the assistance that litigants normally provide.52
2.

Civilian Genetic Injuries Arising Out of In-Service Injuries
to Servicemen

Every appellate court that has considered the question has ruled that
the United States is not liable under the FTCA for birth defects of
servicemen's offspring that allegedly arose out of injuries their parents
on the merits" despite absence of analogous state law duty) with Broudy v. United States, No.
79-2626, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1985), appealdocketed No. 86-5553 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986)
(district court dismissed case for third time on defendant's pretrial motion); see also In re
Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
appeal docketed No. 85-2842 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1985) (forty-three servicemen's radiation cases
dismissed because "[n]o facts ... put forward by plaintiffs ... permit a trier of fact to find
the commission of an 'independent post-service negligent act' "necessary, under Broudy, to
evade Feres); Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.) (dismissed after
remand in consolidation with In re Consol. United States Atomospheric Testing Litig., supra),
cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985); Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.
1985) (remanded to district court and presently pending on defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
49. 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985), reh. denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 879.
51. Cole v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
52. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States (Stanley I1), 786 F.2d 1490, 1499 (1 lth Cir.), reh.
denied, 794 F.2d 687 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986). In Stanley II, relying
on Cole and Johnson v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit first resuscitated, then reversed
the former Fifth Circuit's preclusion of an FTCA claim brought by a veteran who had
participated voluntarily in an LSD experiment while on active duty in the Army. Id.; see Stanley
v. CIA (Stanley 1), 639 F.2d 1146, 1159-60 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); see also Cole, 755 F.2d at
880; Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd en banc, 779 F.2d
1492 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986); supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text
(discussing Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cole); infra notes 66-69, 90 and accompanying text
(discussing Eleventh Circuit's decision in Johnson). The prior panel had erred, stated the Eleventh
Circuit, by ending inquiry with the "finding that Stanley was acting incident to military service
at the time of the incident," and not proceeding to the "next level of inquiry to determine whether
the considerations underlying the Feres doctrine militated against" the suit. Stanley II, 786 F.2d
at 1498. Plaintiff Stanley took no appeal at the time, nor did he take the Stanley II appeal;
it was brought by certain individual defendants who, like Stanley, neither raised nor briefed the
FTCA issue in the appellate court. The issue was decided because the appellate court-not the
parties-wanted it decided.
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suffered incident to active military service.13 The case law nevertheless is
noteworthy because of the extreme dismay these courts express at Feres'

ineluctable effect on such claims. Courts "sense the injustice ... of [the]
result" and note that"[rlarely does the law visit upon a child the conseto the parents. ' 5 4

quences of actions attributed
Genetic injury case law also is noteworthy for the analytic gymnastics

the occasional dissenting district court will perform to avoid Feres. In what

one commentator described as a "flagrant violation" of Feres, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation determined to try FTCA genetic injury

claims that arose out of servicemen's exposure to herbicide used in the
Vietnam War.-" The declared centerpiece of the court's analysis was the
"degree" of the trial's predicted effect on military discipline and effectiveness.16 This would seem to have settled the question in favor of the Feres

bar since the gravamen of the claims was the United States' negligent
selection and deployment of combat materiel in a foreign war: a virtual
archtype of the Feres-barredlawsuit. 7 The United States accordingly argued
that the trial would be indistinguishable from trial of the exposed service-

men's own claims (which the court had held barred by Feres).
Relying in part on a rationale taken from the lower court opinion in
Hinkie v. United States,5s the Agent Orange district court responded by
saying merely that "[t]his may be true but it is irrelevant" because some
twenty years had elapsed since the exposure.5 9 Neither the Agent Orange
53. See Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1021 (1984) ("An action for damages by [plaintiff] would raise the same issues, and take
the same form, as an action by her [serviceman] father .... The complaint avers that
[plaintiff's] injuries derive from her father's exposure to radiation. At trial, [plaintiff] would
be required to contest the prudence of exposing her father to radiation. This examination is
foreclosed by Feres."); see also Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1098 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom Sheehan v. United States, 466 U.S. 975 (1984); Lombard v.
United States, 690 F.2d 215, 223-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983);
Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133-34 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
989 ( 1982); cf. West v. United States, 744 F.2d 1317, 1318 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985).
54. Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1021 (1984). Compare Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[w]e are
not blind to the tragedy of [the child's] condition, and we regret the effects of our conclusion"),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983) with Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 134.(9th Cir.
1981) ("[t]he result in this case disturbs us, particularly with respect to [the child]....
Unfortunately, we are bound [by law] .... ), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 989 (1982).
55. See P. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRuiL 131 (1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1253-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
56. See Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1250-52.
57. Cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
8 (1973); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1952).
58. 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
59. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1253.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:51

nor the Hinkie district court explained how this theory-a sort of reverse
statute of limitations that renders a cause more actionable as decades passmight work; nor did either attempt to find support for it in the FTCA.
The central effort of both the Agent Orange and the Hinkie courts was
to conjure a series of "eve[r] more esoteric hypothetical" FTCA claims in
search of one "analytically identical" to those at bar, but which nevertheless
seemed triable despite Feres.60 The courts' hypotheticals included, among
others, an imaginary Buick accident near the Brooklyn Port Authority; 61 an
exploding prosthetic implant; 62 a military plane crash; 63 and a nuclear test
causing harm to civilians.64 The courts thus sought the answer to the cases
at hand by departing as far from them as imagination could go. Additionally, neither court explained why the existence of an analogous hypothetical,
not barred by Feres, more readily supports reducing Feres to permit the
suits at bar than it supports reading Feres-or a related jurisdictional bar
like the discretionary function or combatant activities exceptions to the
65
FTCA-to cover the hypothetical.
3. United States v. Shearer Construed as a Reduction of Feres
Shearer held that Feres does bar suit for an injury not typically
classifiable as incident to service (i.e., an injury occurring off-base to an
off-duty serviceman) if it implicates certain "core" Feres concerns (military
discipline, management of the military establishment). The Eleventh Circuit
en banc and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted this holding to discard the
rest of the Feres apple: that is, to rescind the classic indices of incidence to
service, e.g., on-base situs of injury, active-duty status of claimant and
availability of alternative compensation.
In Johnson v. United States,6 an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed a
district court's unremarkable decision that Feres barred an FTCA suit to
redress negligence by the Federal Aviation Administration that allegedly
caused the crash of decedent-serviceman's military aircraft during a military
mission. The panel first noted the "widespread, almost universal criticism"
60. Id. at 1252.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Hinkie, 524 F. Supp. at 277.
64. Id. at 284.
65. Because of its expressly "tentative" nature, the Agent Orange ruling was denied
mandamus and collateral appeal. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 733 F.2d 10
(2d Cir. 1984) (denial of mandamus); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 745 F.2d 161
(2d Cir. 1984) (denial of collateral appeal). It now pends as one element of the consolidated
final appeals in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., C.A. Nos. 85-6153 and 86-6127 (2d
Cir. 1986). It has never been followed. Cf. West v. United States, 744 F.2d 1317, 1318 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (on rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
dismissal of an FTCA claim for birth defects allegedly caused by the Army's mistyping of the
parent's blood during his preinduction physical examination). Hinkie, of course, was reversed
on appeal. See Hinkie, 715 F.2d at 99.
66. 749 F.2d 1530 (l1th Cir. 1985), aff'd en banc, 779 F.2d 1492 (lth Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986). Interestingly, during oral argument of Johnson in the United States
Supreme Court, the Court voiced concern over academic criticism of the Feres doctrine.
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of the "much maligned" Feres doctrine, 67 then decided that when something
called:
the Feres factual paradigm is present, the issue is whether the injury
arose out of or during the course of an activity incident to service.... If, however, the alleged tortfeasor is not a member of the
armed forces, [the issue is whether permitting recovery
would] 'circumvent the purposes of the [FTCA] ...
'"
On rehearing, the en banc court, split nine to three, found Shearer to be
"most helpful . . . reinforce[ment]" of this analysis. 69
In Atkinson v. United States,70 the Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of
an active-duty, pregnant servicewoman's medical malpractice action, for the
interesting reason that since "pregnant servicewomen did not serve on active
duty in 1950 when Feres was decided . . . the Supreme Court, in barring
the two malpractice claims involved in Feres, could not have" intended to
bar Ms. Atkinson's claim. 71 "Congress did not exclude military personnel
from FTCA coverage," said the court; the Supreme Court did.72 "Given
Shearer's command that in each case we determine the effect of a suit on
military decisions or discipline, '7 3 the panel countenanced the suit despite
on-base situs of injury; on-duty status of claimant, but for whose military
service the medical care would not have been rendered; and the availability
to Ms. Atkinson of alternative compensation.
By the reasoning of Johnson and Atkinson, Shearer effectively revokes
Feres in a large family of cases, including medical malpractice, vehicle
accidents, slip-and-falls, etc., wherein an on-base, active duty serviceman
compensated by military benefits enjoys FTCA relief merely because the
claim strikes beside-not into-"the core of [Feres] concerns." 74 Shearer
thus becomes an admission by the High Court that, in Feres, it misinterpreted the FTCA.
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court could, consistent with accepted
67. Id. at 1535, 1538.
68. Id. at 1537 (citation omitted).
69. See Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492, 1493 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 59 (1986); see also Pierce v. United States, No. 86-8339, slip op. (Ilth Cir. March 29, 1987)
(split panel reversed dismissal of serviceman's suit to redress injuries suffered in a collision with
a government-owned vehicle driven by a Navy recruiter).
70. 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id.
74. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3043. The Third Circuit has expressly rejected the case-by-case
approaches to Feres analysis that Johnson and Atkinson represent. Martinelli v. United States,
No. 86-3530, slip op. (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 1987). It instead has reaffirmed the view "held... by
the majority of courts that Feres is a per se bar of damage actions against the United States
and military officers arising out of injuries to military personnel." Id. But the Second Circuit
subsequently also endorsed a reductionist interpretation of Shearer.See Sanchez v. UnitedStates,
No. 86-6198, slip op. (2d Cir. March 12, 1987) (panel reversed dismissal of a serviceman's suit
for vehicle collision injuries allegedly caused by a military base service station's negligent repair
of the serviceman's car in which he was a passenger).
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legal precepts, derogate so well-ratified a statutory interpretation as the
Feres doctrine. 75 It is doubtful that the Court would want to do So. 7 6 And
it is most doubtful of all that the Court would do so without even
straightforwardly saying so-in a case, no less, wherein it refused to reduce
the doctrine to a "bright-line" litmus test, and reversed an appellate court's
77
rejection of the doctrine.
Despite this, a noteworthy minority of courts held to the contrary. And
despite the dictates of Feres, some district courts accept FTCA genetic injury
claims that arise out of in-service injuries to service members, and some appellate courts stubbornly endorse a controversial post-discharge 'exception'
to the doctrine. Such decisions best seem explained less by.logic or analysis
than by courts' visceral dislike of the doctrine, their regret that it has "refused to die the quiet death that some had anticipated," 7 8 and their belief
that equity demands erosion of Feres. How legitimate are these concerns?

Tim EQUITY QuEsTION
Because critics do not precisely explain Feres' "draconian harshness"
toward servicemen, 79 some speculation about it is necessary. Of course, the

bare conclusion that it is invariably unfair to deny judicial recovery to a
serviceman is overly simple. Yet that is the tone of some comment. 0 A
certain indulgence toward servicemen is, of course, understandable and
appropriate. They are owed a profound debt for services rendered and
sacrifices made in the nation's defense. But, perhaps because it is so
75. See supra, note 32 (discussing Congressional ratification of Feres doctrine).
76. Consistency on the Court in preserving the Feres doctrine has only two noteworthy
exceptions: two justices dissented from the decision in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, and two justices dissented from the decision in Brooks v. United States. See Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674-77 (1967) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(joined by Brennan, J., dissenting); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 54 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting without opinion). There is little evidence that the doctrine
is under reconsideration, much less attack, in the High Court. See, e.g., Graver v. Int'l Playtex
Corp., 786 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Graver v. United States, 107 S. Ct..184
(1986) (service member's medical malpractice case held barred by Feres, in which Supreme
Court declined certiorari); Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (1986) (wrongful
death action permitted despite decedent's active duty status and performance of military
mission because negligence alleged was committed by non-military federal agency), aff'd en
banc, 779 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986).
77. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3043.
78. Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1534 (citation omitted).
79. Uncle Sam's Hold Over Vets, DISTRICT LAW. (March-April 1982), reprinted in The
Feres Doctrine as it Relates to Private Claims, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agency
Admin. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
80. E.g., Hislop-Brumfield, Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A Veteran's
Last Battle, 14 PAC. L.J. 333, 355 (1983). See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597
F. Supp. 740, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) related appeal docketed, No. 85-6083 (2d Cir. April 2,
1985) (district court stated that whether Agent Orange actually caused veterans' injuries was
"beside the point," and condemned government's failure to contribute to settlement as "cruel
abandonment of veterans"); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221,
1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-6153 (2d Cir. June 11, 1985).
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appropriate and compelling, such indulgence may do more to obscure than
illuminate equity. 8'
The substance of Feres criticism doubtless involves a more refined

equitable principle than preference for servicemen. It rather presupposes a
belief that servicemen have less access to relief for their government-caused
personal injuries than nonservicemen similarly situated. Popular disdain for
Feres is compelling evidence that this belief is widely held. But not only is

it false, the opposite is true. In fact, servicemen enjoy more relief for their
government-caused personal injuries than their closest counterpartsnonmilitary federal employees. 8"
The applicable statutes demonstrate how this occurs. First, the military
compensation scheme, including the Veterans Benefits Act (VBA), 3 is

exceedingly broad. It is so broad that it more closely resembles a universal
health and disability insurance policy than ordinary workmen's compensation. Unlike the compensation scheme for nonmilitary federal employees,
the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA),

4

the military scheme

provides benefits for substantially all disabilities or injuries sustained or
aggravated during a serviceman's federal service. There is no scope of

employment test, thus no standard claimant's burden of proof of employ-

s6
ment-connection; 5 there is not even a typical adversary claims process.

81. See Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Mass. 1959), wherein
the court criticizes an equitable indulgence toward seamen, saying ".... I do not believe that
to say 'seaman are the favorites of admiralty' should be to create a corresponding class of
villains on whom to impose a new type of liability." Id.
82. This broad generalization involves some imprecision that is important to recognize.
That is, active servicemen are not entitled to veterans benefits (discussed below), only veterans
are. The general term "servicemen" nevertheless is used here because more exact subcategorization complicates the comparisons drawn here, yet highlights details that have attracted no
particular critical attention. For example, the "victim" of the post-discharge tort is not a
serviceman, but a veteran, though servicemen are the commonly perceived "victims" of Feres.
The relative insignificance of the serviceman-veteran distinction is readily illustrated. An
in-service injury without permanent disability will not generate veterans benefits to a serviceman.
But, in effect like his civilian counterpart whose medical expenses and lost wages will be
statutorily reimbursed, that serviceman will not incur any out-of-pocket medical expenses or
lost wages. Nor is his injury of a type that has been the focus of recent Feres criticism.
83. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
84. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1982)
(United States' liability under FECA "is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the
United States ....

").

When injured "while in the performance of his duty,"

the federal

employee has no election of remedies. See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1982); United States v. Demko,
385 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1966). And it is the administrative appeal board, not the federal bench,
that resolves questions of coverage in close cases. See 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(2) (1982); Heilman
v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1984).
85. See 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982). Section 310 of Title 38 of the United States Code
prescribes basic entitlements for injury or disease suffered or aggravated "in line of duty, in
the active military ... during period of war," but this apparently limiting language is abrogated
by other statutory and regulatory provisions. E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 105 (1982); 38 C.F.R. § 3.301
(1986). The fact is that VBA covers virtually every disability resulting from injury or disease
occurring coincident with military service. For benefits to be awarded, it is not necessary to
relate a current disability to the performance of some military task or duty.
86. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1986). Section 3.103(a) of title 38 of the Code of Federal
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Barring his own willful misconduct that results in disability, the government
compensates the serviceman for whatever physical adversity affects or befalls

him so long as he is a member of the military.
Second, unlike FECA, VBA is not exclusive. There is an epidemic of
confusing comment on the nonexclusivity of the VBA, even in the Supreme
Court. Shearer, for example, stated that availability of VBA death benefits
to a plaintiff, is "no longer controlling" of the applicability of Feres.8 7 But
the availability of VBA benefits never controlled the Feres inquiry; the

Supreme Court allowed FTCA recovery for VBA-covered injuries in Brooks
before it decided Feres, and again afterwords in Brown. Thus, as long ago
as 1949, the Supreme Court recognized that servicemen injured by the
negligence of a federal employee could recover both veterans benefits and

FTCA damages so long as their injuries were not "incident to service." In
this respect, the VBA is not only unlike FECA, it is unlike-and more

generous than-the vast majority of workmen's compensation statutes. 88
Third, the VBA affords more compensation than the FTCA, not merely
because proof of the normal elements of tortious wrongdoing are no
prerequisite to VBA relief, but also because the FTCA's many express

exemptions and exceptions-the residue of sovereign immunity-do not
apply under the VBA.

9

The result of all this is a simple but unappreciated situation. Of all
federal wrongs that cause lasting disability to servicemen, all are compenRegulations provides in pertinent part, that "[i]t is the obligation of the Veterans Administration
to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to his claim and to render a decision
which grants him every benefit that can be supported in law while protecting the interests of
the Government." Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c) (1986) ("[I]t is the responsibility of the
Veterans Administration . . . to suggest the submission of evidence which the claimant may
have overlooked and which would be of advantage to his position."); Veterans Administration
Manual M21-1, § 4.03(a) (1985); Waiters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180,
3183 (1985).
87. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3043 n.4.
88. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966) ("[C]ompensation laws are
practically always thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to, common-law tort actions."); Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53. As the Brooks Court observed, "[u]nlike the usual workmen's
compensation statute ... there is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws which
provides for exclusiveness of remedy." Id. (citation omitted).
VBA's lack of exclusivity is not surprising. The veterans' compensation scheme long
predated the 1946 enactment of the FTCA. At the time it originally was formulated, Congress
had no reason to think the scheme could be anything but exclusive. Not only did sovereign
immunity proscribe federal tort lawsuits across-the-board, but also such lawsuits by servicemen
were for all practical purposes unimaginable. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142 (calling federal tort
lawsuits "novel and unprecedented"); id. at 146 (and a "radical departure from established
law"); id. at 141 ("We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to
recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving").
Since the FTCA was enacted and Brooks was decided, Congress has not modified the VBA's
nonexclusivity nor its comprehensiveness; nor made it more typical of other workers' compensation schemes. On the contrary, Congress has broadened VBA in some respects. See infra,
note 95.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1982) (excepting from VBA's coverage claims "based
upon" discretionary functions, and claims "arising in" a foreign country or "arising out of"
a wide range of intentional torts and protected federal activities, e.g., military combat, delivery
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sated by VBA and some, in addition, also are compensated under the
FTCA. By contrast, of all federal wrongs that cause such disability to
nonmilitary federal employees some are compensated only by the FECA;
some are compensated only under the FTCA; and some are not compensated
at all. If servicemen enjoyed other federal employees' freedom from Feres,
and suffered other federal employees' FECA and FTCA limitations, fewer
of their injuries would entitle them to federal relief.
Thus, a court that amends Feres to alleviate its "draconian harshness,"
instead broadens the already fuller access to federal compensation that
servicemen enjoy over and above other federal employees. In this respect,
it is far from obvious why revoking Feres would strike a blow for justice.
Consider, for example, Johnson v. United States, supra, wherein decedent-serviceman perished during a military mission. Plaintiff-administratrix clearly qualified for widows' VBA death benefits. Yet the Eleventh
Circuit creatively redefined the "maligned" Feres doctrine to reverse dismissal because the administratrix's claim was "based solely upon the conduct
of civilian employees of the [FAA] ... who were not in any way involved
in military activities. ' '90 An opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc illuminates the majority's analytical errors. But neither the majority
nor the dissent recognized a major anomoly of the result. Had the aircrash
been a civilian event, that is, had a civilian federal employee died in a crash
while on a purely civilian mission for the government, his administratrix would
have no access to FTCA relief, Feresnotwithstanding.' One can only speculate
whether the Eleventh Circuit, if faced with this hypothetical case, would have
worked as hard to avoid FECA as it worked in Johnson to avoid Feres.
These observations may not completely dispel concern that Feres is
unfair to servicemen, but two criticisms can be anticipated and set aside.
First, it is no retort to say that all plaintiffs-servicemen or civilian-prefer
judicial tort relief to statutory compensation, and that servicemen are
harmed by reduced FTCA access. Workmen's compensation schemes, including VBA and FECA, are compromises that generally benefit employees.92
Certainly, neither federal nor state employee compensation schemes have
triggered the flood of protest that Feres has. Furthermore, the FTCA's
of mail, customs, etc.); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (government is neither vicariously
nor strictly liable under FTCA); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (no punitive damages are available
under FTCA); 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (FTCA plaintiffs may not have a jury trial); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675 (1982) (FTCA plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit); 28
U.S.C. § 2678 (1982) (there is a statutory limit on attorney's fees payable in FTCA actions).
90. Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1535-36.
91. See Johnson, 779 F.2d at 494-97 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 191 (1983); Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472,
474 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 194 (1983) ("In enacting
[FECA's exclusive liability] provision, Congress adopted the principal compromise-the 'quid
pro quo'-commonly found in workers' compensation legislation: employees are guaranteed
the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without the need for
litigation, but in return they lose the right to sue the Government."); see also Grijalva v.
United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986).
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express exceptions as well as its other limiting provisions reduce the advantage to plaintiffs of judicial-as opposed to statutory-relief for federal
wrongs. 93
Second, it is no complaint against Feres that the Veterans Administration
(VA) disputes service-connection for certain kinds of injuries, e.g., cancer
allegedly caused by exposure to radiation or Agent Orange. 94 A VBA
claimant's burden of proof, if it may be called that, is ephemerally light
by comparison to the standard he would face in court. 95 A failed VBA
claim for such injuries is a fortiori a failed FTCA claim for them. Feres
does not even enter the picture. Nor does Feres deprive a VBA claimant of
access to judicial review of a denial of his claim. That review is flatly
precluded by statute. 96 A statutory bar also applies to judicial review of
FECA claim rulings.9 If it is true that the VA awards VBA benefits with
undue restraint, amending or revoking the Feres doctrine not only will fail
to correct the problem, it conceivably could aggravate it by casting a shadow
98
of adversariness over the VA's processing of active servicemen's claims.
Even discarding these inapt protests, however, doubt about the equity
of Feres may outlive demonstration that servicemen have greater access than
civilian federal employees to government compensation for personal injuries.
For example, it remains true that Feres, by its terms, cuts off tort relief
for non-servicemen outside the umbrella of VBA protection, such as tort
defendants whose third-party FTCA actions are barred by Feres, and persons
claiming genetic injuries that arose from servicemen's in-service exposure to
radiation or herbicides. Of course, this fact is irrelevant to Feres' fairness
to servicemen, whose welfare has been the central concern of Feres critics.
More importantly, the equitable dilemma posed is often more apparent than
real.

93. See supra text following note 88.
94. E.g., Hislop-Brumfield, supra note 80 ("The government exposed thousands of
servicemen to radiation and Agent Orange. These veterans are not receiving any redress for
their injuries. Unless the courts accept the post-service tort, these veterans will remain
uncompensated.").
95. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982) (VBA's ready compensation of all "injury suffered
or disease contracted in line of duty," or aggravated therein), with PROSSER AND KEETON, THE
LAw OF TORTS § 103 (1984) (Usual preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in tort). Ironically,
considering the storm of indignation surrounding denial of radiation- and herbicide-associated
claims, this dichotomy is exaggerated apropos such etiologically complicated claims. Congress
has recently lightened the VBA claimant's already slight burden, transforming it into a
presumption of service-connection unless the VA can prove other causation for certain
conditions associated with toxic substances. See Pub. L. 98-542, § 4, 98 Stat. 2727 (1984)
(appearing as a note to 38 U.S.C. § 354 (1982) (Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure
Compensation Standards; Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose). Some courts,
meanwhile, are tightening standards of proof for etiologically uncertain claims. See, e.g.,
Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(2) (1982).

98. See supra note 86.
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Consider first Feres' preclusion of third-party FTCA claims brought by
defendants sued for redress of injuries to active servicemen. The prototypical
fact pattern is set out in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,99
wherein a government subcontractor was sued for product liability by a
serviceman injured when his ejection system malfunctioned. The Supreme
Court affirmed dismissal of the subcontractor's third-party FTCA claims
against the United States, noting that the trial of the third-party action
would "take virtually the identical form" to trial of the serviceman's own
FTCA action-one obviously barred by Feres.'°°
This result is certainly less harsh than it seems. As the Stencel Aero
Court put it, "since the relationship between the United States and [thirdparty] is based on a commercial contract, there is no basis for a claim of
unfairness... ."101 Moreover, a government contractor defense has been
held to shield military contractors from tort liability under various tests
that examine both equitable concerns and Feres.10 2
A more compelling challenge to equity is made by Feres' preclusion of
claims for genetic injury that arise out of incident-to-service injuries of
military personnel. Even here, however, exaggeration of Feres' unfairness
arguably has occurred because of the novelty and uncertain scientific validity of
genetic injury claims.
In this setting, it is one thing to assume the truth of a claim for purposes
of assessing jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b), but another to accept its
truth for purposes of deciding whether a lack of jurisdiction is unfair.
Actionable prebirth negligence is a relatively new idea; so is the allegation
that the federal government is responsible for prebirth injuries on a large
scale in connection with military deployment of atomic weapons and chemical herbicides. Until evidence better supports causation, neither the executive
branch (by administering VBA) nor the legislative branch (by amending
VBA) will have a meaningful opportunity to consider bringing geneticallyinjured persons within the scope of federal statutory compensation. It is
premature to condemn Feres for cutting off so nascent and uncertain a
10 3
cause of action.

99. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
100. Id. at 673.
101. Id. at 674.

102. Like Feres, the government contractor defense has constitutional roots. It has been
held available where, e.g., the equipment that injured plaintiff conformed to reasonably precise
specifications established or approved by the United States, and the contractor warned the
United States about known errors or inherent dangers in the product as specified. See Tozer
v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
448-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1983); cf.Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778
F.2d 736, 740-41 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 2243 (1986).
103. But see Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1082 (1983) (Feres held to bar child's claim for congenital rubella associated with
serviceman-mother's negligent medical treatment). Of course, the military dependent is not

without statutory relief. See Civilian Health and Med. Program of the Uniformed Serv.
(CHAMPUS), 10 U.S.C. § 1090 (1982). The rare case in which Title 10 does not apply and
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Even more pertinent to this inquiry, however, is the fact that such
genetic injury claims would doubtless not be actionable under the FTCA
even if Feres did not bar them. A court already has so held apropos the
1°4
gravamen of the typical genetic injury claim, the nuclear test program.
Indeed, it appears that FECA would bar such claims in the civilian setting. °5
THE ACCOUNTABILTY QUESTION

Of greater concern than the arguable phantoms of unfairness discussed
above is the fact that the government is not answerable in tort to servicemen for
much of the negligence of the military services. Is Feres thus "unfair" in
some sense to all of us by reducing the military's accountability for its
wrongs?
This is a difficult question that raises many others. What, for example,
is the fruit of accountability? Individual accountability would seem to
improve individual performance. Yet, some have made a case for the
opposite proposition in the field of medicine, for example, where increased
exposure to tort liability may encourage the practice of defensive medicine
that is not always in all patients' best interests. °6 And even if individual
accountability does generally improve individual performance, it does not
readily follow that institutional accountability improves individual performance. Moreover, Department of Defense-related FTCA judgments are paid
out of a general judgment fund-a permanent indefinite appropriation. 0 7
Because such judgments impose no specific liability on particular military
agencies, the chain of accountability in the area of civil torts, and its
influence toward excellence, is extremely attenuated-certainly more attenuated than the chain of accountability in the existing military justice system.
Even assuming that FTCA liability would increase the excellence of
military performance, one is met with a possibly knottier question. What
kind of military excellence would it be? Perhaps safer barracks would be
built by a government made liable for failing to prevent barracks fires, but
would future wars be better fought by a government made liable for

Feres cuts off an otherwise actionable and valid genetic injury claim poses a wrong without a
remedy; it raises the question whether relief is appropriate by private congressional bill. See
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953).
104. See In re Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759, 776
(N.D. Cal. 1985).
105. See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). In Grijalva, a
daughter's claim for loss of support derived from her mother's work-related injuries, and thus
was a FECA-barred derivative claim like loss of consortium. Id.; see Smither & Co. v. Coles,
242 F.2d 220, 224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Levine v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (D.
Mass. 1979).
106. E.g., Middleton, The Medical Malpractice Wars, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 9,
col. 2; STAFF OF SENATE CoMm. ON LABOR AND HUMAN SERvicEs, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON DEFENsrvE MED. AND MED. MALPRACTICE 10 (Comm. Print 1984); Report, Board
of Trustees (American Medical Association), Study of Professional Liab. Costs (Substitute
Resolution 8, A-82) Report: N(I-83) p. 14 (1983).
107. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982).
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undertaking a high-risk military mission? Or deploying novel combat weaponry? As demonstrated in the case of Agent Orange, FTCA jurisdictional
exceptions are no guarantee that actions like the latter two will not be the
focal point of civil tort trials, so this concern is worth pondering.
Were it somehow resolved, the most important question would still
remain. While more military accountability may well be preferable to less,
is accountability to the judicial branch of government preferable to accountability to the political branches "directly responsible-as the Judicial Branch
is not-to the electoral process?"'' 0 For reasons that are obvious in a
democracy, the reverse seems more likely.'0 9
As these questions demonstrate, Feres is not so much the cause of
limited federal tort liability for military negligence as it is the fruit of other
causes-constitutional separation of powers 1 and the "inescapable demands
of military discipline.""' Neither of these has been criticized seriously as
"unfair" to anyone, and neither should be regarded as a removable roadblock to some court's rough sense of justice.
Because of Feres' constitutional dimension, this fairness inquiry includes
the question: fairness to whom? Besides the plaintiff serviceman and the
federal defendant, such lawsuits indirectly involve the citizens to whom the
political branches (and through them the military services) answer. Is it
fairer to risk military effectiveness and compromise military accountability
to the political branches in order to afford unusual judicial relief to federal
employees who are servicemen? Or fairer to protect the former interests
and confine servicemen to more ordinary statutory relief for work-related
injuries that federal employees generally receive?
In applying and preserving the Feres doctrine, the Supreme Court
continues to respect Congress's quite reasonable choice of the latter course.
CONCLUSION

There is good reason for the Supreme Court to remain unbuffeted by
popular prejudice against the Feres doctrine. Servicemen already enjoy
108. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
109. One wonders whether the Ninth Circuit panel that revoked Feres in Ms. Atkinson's
medical malpractice action realized that, just last term, Congress declined to pass legislation
that would have the same effect. See supra note 88. The Congressmen who voted against that
bill may well take umbrage at the Ninth Circuit's preemption of their legislative decision. So
might their constituents.
110. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301-302 (1983). Separation of powers also
is served by section 2680(a) of title 28 of the United States Code, an FTCA exclusion so
peculiarly implicated in Feres that at least one commentator has suggested that the "inequitable"
doctrine be discarded because the discretionary function exception serves some of its purposes.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); Note, From Feres to Stenceh Should Military PersonnelHave
Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 1099, 1126 (1979). But Feres protects against
the judicial inquiry, not merely damage recovery. See supra, note 10. Section 2680(a), however
well-intentioned to perform the same service, frequently does not. See, e.g., United States v.
S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aeria Rio Grandense (Vatig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1984)
(reversed judgment entered after trial of claim barred by § 2680(a)).
11l. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983).
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greater access to federal relief for most injury than do all other federal
employees; equity does not compel exacerbating this disparity by revoking
or limiting Feres.
Given Feres' equitable neutrality, judicial undermining of this congressionally ratified doctrine seems inappropriate. The "power of oversight and
control of military force by elected representatives and officials ... underlies
our entire constitutional system;"1 2 and restraint of judicial relief for
government negligence to servicemen is internationally recognized as necessary
to military discipline and effectiveness." 3 If the United States is to assume
the risk to national security of interposing tort liability into the "peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,"" 4 the "least dangerous"
branch should leave that pathbreaking decision to the others.

112. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (cited in Shearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3044). See
Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1971); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705,
710 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
113. See supra note 32.
114. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. at 3043 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963),
quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).

